Effective aid conditionality and human rights protection in Afghanistan

 

Abstract

 

Aid to Afghanistan has been manipulated to geopolitical ends. Historically, far from guaranteeing stronger rights protection, an increase in aid funds has often been to the detriment of ordinary Afghans, all under the guise of ethical foreign policy. The overthrow of the Taliban in 2001 gave way to a very lax approach to aid conditionality, where security trumped rights protection. This was not altogether surprising, however, because conditionality brings with it a new set of challenges around ownership of the process, capacity issues and accountability questions. What emerges from the research is that Afghanistan has experienced little effective human rights conditionality even up to the present day. More encouragingly, however, there are opportunities for an effective application thereof as international engagement in the country takes new forms.

Introduction

Since the 2002 fiscal year, the United States alone has funnelled over $104 billion worth of aid into Afghanistan.[1] By early 2015, when adjusted for inflation, US spending on the country had exceeded that of the Marshall Plan.[2] Dozens of countries have joined the donor effort, but the achievements pale in comparison to the investment. While on the one hand, improvements to education and healthcare have seen 8 million students enrol in school (up from 900,000 in 2002) and life expectancy rise to 64 years (up from 42 in 2002), many other development targets have plateaued, or even regressed.[3] Indeed, opium cultivation has reached record levels in Afghanistan; the startling comparison here is that record lows had been attained in the year 2000, when the Taliban was still in power![4] Today, Afghanistan has gone from being not just the world’s biggest supplier of heroine and other legal opiates, but is fast becoming the world’s biggest consumer.[5] As more and more Afghans (children included[6]) become addicted, one epidemic metastasizes into another: the number of HIV/AIDS cases is on the rapid ascent.[7] And yet, at least $7.6 billion has been spent on counternarcotics by the US alone.[8] Huge pockets of exclusion also persist in Afghanistan, with 36% of the country still living below the poverty line, a figure decreasing only at a snail’s pace.[9] Corruption clearly plays a huge part in all of this, but there is little evidence of progress as the country remains at the bottom of Transparency International’s ranking (172 out of 175).[10] The human rights record remains patchy, with a deteriorating security situation threatening basic rights, and women’s indefatigable efforts coming under renewed threat from not only armed groups like the Taliban, but conservative government ministers.[11] There is a clear need to re-evaluate the efficacy of international aid in Afghanistan. This paper will first explore the lessons learned from the Afghan experience of aid conditionality, and then assess what role, if any, aid conditionality has played in improving Afghanistan’s human rights protection.

 Lessons learned from Afghan aid conditionality

  1. The history of aid conditionality in Afghanistan

In early twentieth century pre-war Afghanistan, aid initially came in the form of external funding from Britain (a former imperial ruler) in order to maintain political stability, but by the mid twentieth-century Afghanistan had become a key pawn in the Cold War machinations of the United States and the Soviet Union.[12] Afghanistan was thus transformed into a ‘rentier’ state, in which external finance propped up the ruling elite, allowing them to rule without establishing any form of domestic accountability through tax revenues.[13] Indeed, 40% of the state budget was derived from foreign aid by the 1960s.[14] The result was what Goodhand has termed a ‘bifurcation of the Afghan economy’[15], by which society was split between a poor, largely independent subsistence economy on the one hand, and an urban economy on the other, which depended on the state. The Soviet invasion in 1979, however, led to the termination of virtually all Western development contracts, but the continued Russian support to urban areas under their control accentuated further the state dependence on foreign aid.[16] As violence and displacement soared during the ten-year Soviet occupation, Western finance took the form of aid programmes that were geared in one sense towards the mitigation of humanitarian distress, but also formed part of a broader strategy to weaken and undermine the communist government.[17] Society was also fragmented further as flows of money went to opposing factions; Western aid was funnelled through local commanders, exacerbating national-regional tensions and by-passing certain areas according to political ties and proximity.[18] Humanitarian need was eminently not the sole criterion therefore, but even in areas which benefited better than others a ‘culture of dependency’ became apparent as food production fell by as much as two-thirds in some urban and rural areas.[19] Among the most controversial side effects was the acceptance on the part of some donors of up to 40% ‘wastage levels’[20] on cross-border programmes. Other studies have however suggested that only 20-30% of humanitarian aid reached the intended beneficiaries while the rest fed war efforts. Given that the United States alone was providing over $600 million annually, acquiescing in the face of such high levels of witting corruption, the aid money therefore provided the capital flows necessary to fund drug-smuggling and other illicit businesses.[21] The principle of unconditional aid, or impartial humanitarianism, had therefore become a farce in Afghanistan during the Cold War period. As previously mentioned, the tactic described as making ‘the Russians bleed’[22] meant that aid was given only to the resistance controlled areas, not those that were communist-held, notwithstanding commensurate levels of human suffering in both. A sharp decline in humanitarian budgets followed the withdrawal of the Red Army (i.e. the Russian forces) and political considerations continued to subordinate human need. Of the 2.6 million Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan towards the end of the 1990s, donor expenditure per refugee stood at 10 USD in 1997, 3 USD in 1998 and 13 USD in 1999.[23] This should be compared with contemporary spending on Kosovar refugees: 207 USD per person in need![24] The politicisation of humanitarian aid was no secret during the Taliban rule. Indeed, in 1999 a meeting of the donor countries of the Afghanistan Support Group concluded that “the Taliban’s continued harbouring of international terrorists was negatively affecting the provision of assistance”[25]. The pattern of aid conditionality in Afghanistan during the reign of the Taliban was therefore to isolate the regime rather than to prioritise humanitarian assistance.[26] It will come as a surprise to many that the World Food Programme itself engaged in the politicisation of humanitarian aid, conditioning all food assistance beyond the life-saving kind upon the Taliban’s change of policy in relation to women’s rights, stating in 1999: ‘With strict programme conditions, set from Rome, on gender equality at both the project participation level as well as beneficiary level various (food aid) programmes have been curtailed or restricted because of the inability to fulfil Rome’s conditions.’[27] The irony of such a policy therefore is more women and children suffering malnutrition, all in the name of women’s rights! In a supposed era of ‘ethical foreign policy’, aid to Afghanistan was characterised by sharp contradictions. Aid conditionality therefore has a long and controversial history in Afghanistan. The demonstrable manipulation of humanitarian assistance in order to obtain certain political objectives has led to loss of lives, undermining the very principles it purports to uphold. Much like today, this occurred at a time when human rights protection was touted as a key principle of foreign policy.

  1. Aid conditionality in the post-Taliban era

The removal of the Taliban from government in 2001 and the subsequent signing of the Bonn Agreement were supposed to herald a new era for Afghanistan. Such use of force to bring peace or secure geopolitical interests always leads to contradictions, but in Afghanistan this process has endured for decades and has translated into continued efforts of bargaining and varied forms of conditionality engendering many negative consequences.[28] We have already explored how vast amounts of unconditional assistance provided opportunities for rent-seeking, ingrained corruption and created distributional conflicts. Additionally, it has been made clear that even unconditional donors are far from neutral.

The ‘emergency situation’ of post-Taliban Afghanistan was not seen as favourable to the application of conditionalities, for fear that these would undermine President Karzai’s tenuous administration.[29] Secondly, the fragmented, highly localised nature of Afghan politics made it harder to ensure conditions could be applied; how could a Western donor place conditions on a group of politicians who were undergirded by an array of warlords, factional grouping and other actors with varying degrees of legitimacy? Four years into the NATO intervention, however, many commentators were growing exasperated with what they deemed too soft an approach to conditionality. One Western diplomat suggested in November 2005 that Afghan actors believed they would “get the money no matter what the circumstances are”[30], which raises the question of what the consequences of non-compliance really were at the time. On Goodhand and Sedra’s assessment, there were very little. Indeed, they observe that donors tended to rescind on the conditionalities rather than sanction the Afghans who disobeyed them. One way of understanding this is to acknowledge that Afghan actors are rarely short of fall-back financing, as an illicit economy underpinned by patronage networks alleviates in some ways the need to rely on donor aid. The logic on the part of the donors therefore seemed to be: better our aid money, flawed as it may be, than their drug money!

Can any aid conditionality work in such a context? Can modern-day Afghanistan, with Ashraf Ghani heading a democratically elected government, prove any more amenable to human rights conditionality than its predecessors? To answer this, one must first elaborate on the other key challenges to aid conditionality in this new era.

  1. Challenges to aid conditionality in Afghanistan today

There are several factors which influence the extent and efficacy of aid conditionality in modern-day Afghanistan: ‘the ownership problem’ in the reconstruction process; from this flows ‘the accountability problem’; the problem of enforcing the conditionalities applied; ‘the capacity problem’ relating to the form of technical assistance; and the ‘collective action problem’.[31] These problems will be addressed in turn, before asking what how effective, if at all, human rights conditionality has been in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

  1. i) Ownership: The high level of technical assistance in Afghanistan calls into question the nature of Afghan ownership of the reform agenda, while the aforementioned fragmentation of the political arena contests the very nature of governance. The reform of the Afghan Defence Ministry, for instance, under Minister Fahim was far more of a foreign affair than a national one owing to the decision to limit the Ministry’s involvement in two projects which clearly ought to have fallen under its remit: the formation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR).[32] Indeed, instead of conceiving of conditionalities as a tool to bring about Afghan ownership, they have in fact been used on many an occasion to exclude Afghan actors from the reform process, thereby instilling foreign actors with the responsibility to ensure conditionalities were respected. Freezing out the Afghan government is unworkable in the longer term, however, and the result of this process has been to make the Ministry more “insular and resistant to donor pressure”[33] once imbued with its own decision-making powers.
  2. ii) Enforcement: The failure to enforce conditions became a common feature of the Afghan aid system, exemplified through the blind eye turned to allegations of fraud during the 2005 (check) electoral process. Despite the evidence that the body mandated to oversee the elections, the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), had been captured by factional interests, the international community approved the process, leading one diplomat to argue that “corruption and the capturing of institutions [had] superseded security as the main threat to democracy and stability in Afghanistan”.[34] Poor monitoring is another dimension of enforcement deficiencies, a particularly acute problem in the realm of demobilization. To be sure, the failure to monitor whether demobilized soldiers were ultimately reintegrated into civilian life showed that assessing the effectiveness of the whole DDR programme was bizarrely off the agenda.[35]

iii) Accountability: There are two views on the question of aid accountability and to whom it is owed. On the one hand it is very obviously owed to the donors’ parliaments and therefore domestic taxpayers in respective nations. Yet there is also a need to make donors more accountable to the people and politics of the aid-receiving nation. Arguing for dual accountability does not solve this problem, however; rather it creates its own set of tensions. US domestic interests, namely the War on Terror, motivated the 2001 intervention and steered their policy decisions. Ethical donors like Canada and Germany had less obvious direct strategic interests, but it is argued that their alliance with the United States influenced policy decisions.[36] As such, the presence of even ostensibly neutral actors ultimately betrays a set of geo-strategic interests, for whom accountability can work only one way. Moreover, the deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) is arguably driven by domestic calculations rather than local need. Indeed, although their purpose is to empower local governments to rule more effectively, national governments imposed caveats that restricted how the forces could be used under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) command structure. Impelled by the understandable need to limit casualties, the deployments are “driven by domestic political calculations rather than the demands of the local environment” (Goodhand and Sedra).[37]

  1. iv) Capacity problem: Suhrke and Bucmaster have contended that the international strategy in Afghanistan has been to enhance capacity rather than build it, meaning that parallel administrative structures were set up and capacities were imported, to later be withdrawn.[38] This proved problematic for effective conditionality because this capacity enhancement was often centered around schedules lasting no longer than one year, thus resulting in a rapid turnover of the staff who had acquired small amounts of expertise. Indeed, it should be recalled here that the reconstruction process was led by teams that often lacked adequate training in the nuances and particularities of the local context.[39]
  2. v) Collective action: In addition to the previously discussed fragmentation of the political arena in Afghanistan, collective action on the part of the international community in the reconstruction process is no guarantee of a united front, and also makes it more difficult to hold donors to account for their actions/ensure follow through on conditions. Reform of the justice sector is an illuminating example. Although Italy was nominated to lead the reform, it was quickly discredited, then co-opted by the US and Canada. Such different legal systems between the countries led to diverging aspirations as to the reform process in Afghanistan.[40] The unintended but perhaps fortunate side effect was to afford Afghans more liberty to dictate their own legal norms, but overall the lack of harmony on the part of donors meant they were delegitimized in the process and unable to exercise more effective conditionality.[41]

Notwithstanding the demonstrable shortcomings of aid conditionality, it has been widely used as a policy tool for decades.[42] Empirical studies on the aid conditionality have shown it to be most effective in peace building contexts, particularly where one country or source tends to be the main donor.[43] Such studies attest to the effectiveness of aid conditionality in a country like Afghanistan, to which the United States has been the biggest donor, and where conditionality has been used to address issues of distributional equity, “the use of revenues for peaceful development”, and to promote greater transparency and accountability.[44] What we must now turn to, however, is the question of how effective aid conditionality has been in improving the country’s human rights record.

  1. Human rights conditionality

There are positive instances of aid conditionality that emerged during the Karzai government. The Ministry of Finance indeed spoke of conditionalities as holding a disciplinary role within government, with one advisor remarking: “This government embraces conditionality. They want the international community to be clear on the rules of the game. They want to know the criteria for success”.[45] Furthermore, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and International Crisis Group (ICG) observed a concomitant growth within civil society of actors calling for reforms related to human rights and democracy.[46] This final section exams what, if anything, has been achieved by conditionality in the realm of human rights protection.

  1. i) Conditionality for security rather than rights: The overthrow of the Taliban quickly transformed aid conditionality in Afghanistan. Whereas for years, even organisations like the WFP conditioned their assistance on rights protection, in November 2001 (the start of the US military programme) their strategy changed to providing as much food assistance as possible.[47] It has thus been argued that at least in the immediate aftermath of the Taliban’s overthrow, aid became a tool for ‘securitisation’ rather than encouraging rights protection.[48]
  2. ii) Donor leverage and human rights: According to Goodhand and Sedra, the donors with the greatest leverage and visibility in Afghanistan are the “political-strategic donors” who provide their money bilaterally (examples, Japan and the US). Yet those who have pushed most on human rights have tended to be smaller donors, or those with “less visibility”, who channel their money multi-laterally or through government trust funds. The EU, for example, and countries like Canada, the Netherlands tend to form this “least visible” group of donors – the “ethical principled donors” – and thus have the least traction. The paradox therefore is that “those with the greatest leverage have the least conditional approach”.[49]

iii) Human rights and transitional justice: Suhrke has noted that despite the huge potential for aid conditionalities to incorporate more robust provisions for greater rights protection, human rights have been in many respects “orphaned by the reconstruction process”.[50] Indeed, the limited influence of “ethical-principled donors” like the European Union was made clear by the continued government tenure of human rights violators during the Karzai administration. This was so despite widespread calls in Afghan society to bring such actors to account, observed by both Human Rights Watch and the International Crisis Group.[51] Ultimately however, what this reveals is a lack of will on the part of the largest donor – the US – to use its leverage to promote rights protection in the reconstruction process, rather than an inability to do so. Indeed, Goodhand and Sedra have observed that the strategic interests of the US were focused on anti-terrorism and anti-insurgency, counter-narcotics programmes and forming a long-term partnership with the country.[52] As such, donors who pursued ethical-principled objectives were continually thwarted by the US’s own strategic interests.

  1. iv) Islam and human rights: The international community helped secure the conditions necessary for the Islamic Constitutional Loya Jirga in December 2003, but they remained largely uncritical in the face of reports of intimidation and violence during the electoral process, creating what HRW described as a ‘climate of pervasive fear’.[53] While a compromise on minority language rights in the North laid the groundwork for what has been termed “one of the most progressive” constitutions in the Islamic world, “loopholes” in the constitution provided for the excessive expansion of Supreme Court power beyond its traditional domain and “the reassertion of conservative Islamic jurisprudence”.[54] Conditionality was therefore not applied by donors to call into question the compatibility of Islamic jurisprudence with human rights protection.
  2. v) Human rights and impunity: While Afghanistan’s official electoral law “prohibits anyone who commands or belongs to an unofficial military force or armed group from becoming a candidate”[55] the independent Electoral Complaints Commission excluded only 45 candidates from a 2005 ballot out of a list of 1024 with purported links to armed groups. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission later confirmed high levels of winning candidates who maintained ties to armed groups: 80 per cent in the provinces, 60 per cent in Kabul.[56] Despite concerns echoed by the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, based in Kabul, President Karzai stated that the inclusion of even human rights abusers would help “advance national reconciliation”.[57] The international community was complicit in such a laissez-faire Indeed, one UNAMA official stated that the Coalition was fiercely opposed to the exclusion of any candidates[58] while another asserted that this would indeed “undermine the entire process”.[59] Far from using conditionality to promote human rights, the key donors openly backed impunity for rights abusers.
  1. Human rights situation in present-day Afghanistan

Today in Afghanistan, the government is under less pressure to respect human rights because of international fatigue and the withdrawal of both combat troops and aid. Indeed, Human Rights Watch notes that political engagement has waned and donors have “scaled back most forms of assistance”. [60] Ahead of the September 2014 general election, Amnesty International published a report with a scorecard detailing some signs of progress, but also highlighted missed opportunities, in efforts to improve human rights protection under Karzai’s outgoing government.[61] It was noted that the undeniable gains made on women’s rights must be balanced against the findings that women human rights defenders are working under conditions of increasing insecurity.[62] “Small steps towards accountability for government officials” are overshadowed by a culture of rife impunity, and the work of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission on transitional justice continues to be thwarted.[63] The report also stated that the passing of a new policy supposed to protect the more than 600,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) from forced eviction is a promising step, but the gradual withdrawal of international aid money risks jeopardising such improvements.[64] Freedom of expression is of foremost importance in a rights-respecting nation, for without it discussion and debate around all other violations cannot occur. Some advances have been made in this area, as the Karzai government’s relaxation of licensing laws allowed media outlets to flourish, especially in the cities. Likewise, social media is more popular than ever and is being used to document human rights abuses.[65] Yet in Taliban-controlled areas journalists are severely hampered, facing threats and violence. Moreover, state actors have also been accused of intimidation, and many Afghan journalists say that they continue to self-censor, particularly when reporting on human rights violations, citing fear of reprisals by government officials.[66]

 

 

Conclusion

Although this research paper has not sought to make a normative argument regarding the promotion (or lack thereof) of human rights through conditionality, it has nonetheless been observed that such conditionality can be harmful to ordinary citizens, while the low levels of human rights conditionality in post-Taliban Afghanistan has nonetheless been accompanied by marked improvements in the fields of education, security and economic development.[67] Conditionality in such a context is inevitably difficult, but as international donors reduce their aid donations, human rights organisations are also observing regressive measures with relation to women’s rights, freedom of expression and accountability for rights abusers. It is hoped this paper will contribute to the debate surrounding conditionality, illuminating the hitherto failures and drawing lessons for continuing (or future) aid donors. For one, it has been observed that the largest donors – who often give bilaterally – have the greatest traction. Bilateral agreements between the new, internationally approved government may lay a solid groundwork for greater human rights protection as a result of conditions imposed by ‘ethical principled donors’. Improvements already made to national security and in the reconciliation process should make these donors less reluctant to question the continued culture of impunity, or indeed the acceptability of Islamic jurisprudence from a rights perspective. At the very least, there is a more vocal civil society in Afghanistan than there was fifteen years ago. Given that this paper has cited only rather modest improvements to the human rights record, the good news is that there is enormous scope for progress if well-intentioned donors show the will, and find the means, to learn from past mistakes.

[1] 30 July 2014, ‘The United States Has Outspent the Marshall Plan to Rebuild Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/30/the-united-states-has-outspent-the-marshall-plan-to-rebuild-afghanistan/

[2] Ibid

[3] US AID, Achievements in Afghanistan, http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/Achievements%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf

[4] 27 June 2014, ‘This Is What 12 Years of Failed Drug Policy Looks Like in Afghanistan’, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/27/this-is-what-12-years-of-failed-drug-policy-looks-like-in-afghanistan/

[5] 2 April 2014, ‘How Iran Won the War on Drugs’, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139095/amir-a-afkhami/how-iran-won-the-war-on-drugs

[6] 16 July 2009, AFGHANISTAN: “Opium eases my pain, keeps my children quiet”, Irin News,

http://www.irinnews.org/report/85303/afghanistan-opium-eases-my-pain-keeps-my-children-quiet

[7] 1 December 2013, ‘Afghanistan’s HIV Rate Up 38 Per cent in 2013’, Tolo News,

http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/12928-afghanistans-hiv-rate-up-38-percent-in-2013

[8] See Reference 1

[9] Afghanistan Profile, World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan

[10] 10 December 2014, ‘Transparency International Says Donors Must Insist Afghanistan Introduce Anti-Corruption Reforms’, Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/donors_must_insist_afghanistan_introduce_anti_corruption_reforms_to_fi

[11] 4 April 2014, ‘Too many missed opportunities: Human rights in Afghanistan under Karzai’, Amnesty International,

https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2014/04/too-many-missed-opportunities-human-rights-afghanistan-under-karzai/

[12] Goodhand, J. (2002). Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly23(5), 837-859, pp. 841

[13] A Pain & J Goodhand, ‘Afghanistan: current employment and socio-economic situation and prospects’, International Labour Organisation, InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction Working Paper 8, Geneva, March 2002.

[14] Goodhand, J. (2002). Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly23(5), 837-859, pp. 841

[15] Ibid

[16] Rubin, 2000 op cit, p 1792, ‘The political economy of war and peace in Afghanistan’, World Development 2, 8 (10), pp 1789-1803.

[17] Goodhand, J. (2002). Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan. Third World Quarterly23(5), 837-859, pp. 842

[18] Rubin, 2000 op cit, p 1792, ‘The political economy of war and peace in Afghanistan’, World Development2, 8 (10), pp 1789-1803.

[19] Ibid, pp. 1792

[20] N Nicholds & J Borton, ‘The changing role of NGOS in the provision of relief & rehabilitation assistance: case study1-Afghanistan/Pakistan’ ODI, London, 1994.

[21] Rubin, 2000 op cit, p 1792, ‘The political economy of war and peace in Afghanistan’, World Development2, 8 (10), pp 1792

[22] Atmar, M. H. (2001). Politicisation of humanitarian aid and its consequences for Afghans. Disasters25(4), 321-330.

[23] Ibid

[24] Porter, T. (1999). The partiality of humanitarian assistance-Kosovo in comparative perspective. Porter.

[25] Macrae, J., & Leader, N. (2000) Shifting sands: The search for ‘coherence’ between political and humanitarian responses to complex emergencies, HPG Report 8, Overseas Development Institute, London

[26] Atmar, M. H. (2001). Politicisation of humanitarian aid and its consequences for Afghans. Disasters25(4), 321-330.

[27] Wiles, P., Leader, N., Chan, L., & Horwood, C. (1999) Danida’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. An evaluation, Draft report, Overseas Development Institute, London.

[28] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations,’Clingendael’, pp. 81

[29] Ibid, pp. 83

[30] Ibid, pp. 81

[31] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, pp. 85

[32] Chen, S. (2007). Sentinels of Afghan democracy: the Afghan National Army. (RSIS Working Paper, No. 128). Singapore: Nanyang Technological University, pp. 4

[33] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, pp. 85

[34] Ibid, pp. 87

[35] Rossi, S., & Giustozzi, A. (2006). Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities.

[36] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, pp. 88

[37] Ibid, pp. 89

[38] Surhke, A and Bucmaster, J (2005) ‘Aid, growth and peace: A comparative analysis’, WP2005:13, CMI, Bergen, Norway.

[39] Hughes, C. (2011). The politics of knowledge: ethnicity, capacity and return in post-conflict reconstruction policy. Review of International Studies37(04), 1493-1514.

[40] Gross, E. (2009). Security sector reform in Afghanistan: the EU’s contribution. Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.

[41] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, pp. 91

[42] Dijkstra, A. Geske. “The Effectiveness of Policy Conditionality: Eight Country Experiences.” Development and Change 33(2), 2002: 307-334.

[43] Boyce, James K. “Aid, Conditionality and War Economies: Paper prepared for the International Peace Academy‘s project on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars.” Department of Economics, Univesity of Massachusettes, November 2003

[44] Ibid

[45]Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, pp. 86

[46] Human Rights Watch (2005) ‘Blood-Stained Hands. Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity’ Human Rights Watch, New York; and ICG (2005a) ‘Political Parties in Afghanistan’ Policy Briefing, Asia Briefing No. 39, Kabul/Brussels, 2 June 2005.

[47] Johnson, C. and Leslie, J. (2002) ‘Afghans have their memories: a reflection on the recent experience of assistance in Afghanistan’ Third World Quarterly, Vol. 23, No.5, pp. 861-874.

[48] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations, ‘Clingendael’, pp. 70

[49] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations,’Clingendael’, pp. 78

[50] Suhrke, A (2006) The Limits of State-building: The Role of International Assistance in Afghanistan Paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, San Diego 21-24 March 2006.

[51] Human Rights Watch (2005) ‘Blood-Stained Hands. Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of Impunity’ Human Rights Watch, New York; and ICG (2005a) ‘Political Parties in Afghanistan’ Policy Briefing, Asia Briefing No. 39, Kabul/Brussels, 2 June 2005.

[52] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations,’Clingendael’, pp. 63

[53] Human Rights Watch (2003b) “Killing you is a very easy thin g for us”: Human Rights Abuses in Southeast Afghanistan, vol. 15, no. 5, New York: Human Rights Watch, July.

[54] Thier, J. A. (2004) Re-establishing the Judicial System in Afghanistan, CDDRL Working Paper No. 19, Stanford: Stanford Institute for International Studies, September

[55] Electoral Law, Art. 15, No. 3

[56] IRIN (2005) ‘Afghanistan: Rights Body Warns of Warlords’ Success in Elections’, 18 October.

[57] Reuters (2005) ‘Karzai Defends Afghan Poll Stance as Healing Bid’, 13 September.

[58] Goodhand, J., & Sedra, M. (2006). Bargains for Peace?: Aid, Conditionalities and Reconstruction in Afghanistan. Netherlands Institute of International Relations,’Clingendael’, pp. 58

[59] Ibid, pp. 59

[60] HRW World Report 2015, http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015/country-chapters/afghanistan

[61] Amnesty International Report, Too many missed opportunities: Human rights in Afghanistan under the Karzai administration’, AI Index: ASA 11/004/2014

[62] Ibid, pp. 3

[63] Ibid, pp. 5

[64] Ibid, pp. 4

[65] Ibid, pp. 6

[66] Ibid, pp. 9

[67] 14 August 2014, Taymor Shah Kamrany, Afghanistan 2002-2012: A Decade of Progress and Hope’, Middle East Institute, http://www.mei.edu/content/afghanistan-2002-2012-decade-progress-and-hope

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out / Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out / Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out / Change )

Google+ photo

You are commenting using your Google+ account. Log Out / Change )

Connecting to %s